Description Details
Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgency (COIN); and finally, a longstanding issue, (9) the twenty-first century is about missiles, space, and cyber power and airpower is yesterday’s revolution. The discussion of these “fallacies” should stimulate the appetite of most thoughtful Airmen, but also serious advocates of all services and everyone interested in national defense....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix UNDERSTANDING AIRPOWER: BONFIRE OF THE FALLACIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fallacies to the Left of Them, Fallacies to the Right of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 America, the Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61...

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PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

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Women have served in and with the United States armed forces since the founding of our nation; yet it has only been since the 1970s that issues concerning women in the military have been seriously and systematically pursued by both scholars and military planners. This volume is an effort to identify and examine key events, questions, and policies pertaining to women in the United States armed forces. To do this, a multidisciplinary analytical strategy that incorporates the methodology and conceptual tools of history, social science, organizational theory, policy analysis, and future studies was adopted....

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Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the understanding of airpower—what it is, what it does, why it does it, and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates strategic effect. Airpower’s product is strategic effect on the course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect....

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This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Methodology and Analytical Criteria . . . . 2 Definition of Terms . . . . 4 Summary . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS . . . . . 7 Weinberger’s Principles . . . . . 7 Current Guidance . . . . 11 Planning for Conflict Termination . . . . 13 Summary . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . 17 3 SOMALIA CASE STUDY . . . . 21 Political Considerations . . . . . 22 United Nations Mandates . . . . 23 Exit Strategy . . . . . 25 Success or Failure? . . . . 26 Weinberger’s Principles Revisited . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29 4 HAITI CASE STUDY . . . . 31 Political Considerations . . . . . 32 United Nations Mandates . . . . 34 Exit Strategy . . . . . 35 Success or Failure? . . . . 37 Guidance Revisited . . . . 39 Summary . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . 46...

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The analysis presented in this thesis evaluates the contents of past Air Force strategic vision documents and studies the process used to create such documents. The thesis argument is that strategic vision documents can fulfill important functions for an organization, and that greater attention to the process of creating these documents can result in a more effective final product....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Historical Perspective . . . . . . 2 Overview . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 STRATEGIC VISION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . 5 Vision, Defined and Explained . . . . . 5 Attributes of Vision . . . . . 6 Functions of Vision . . . . . 6 Importance of Vision for an Organization . . . . . 7 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Vision . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . . . 10 3 VISIONS FROM THE PAST . . . . 13 Air Power and the Future . . . . 13 The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach—Global Power . . . . . 15 Global Reach—Global Power: The Evolving Air Force Contribution to National Security . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . 20 4 VISION: A PRESENT-DAY VIEW . . . . 23 An Interest in Updating Our “Guiding Construct” . . . . . . 23 Global Presence . . . . 23 Current Efforts for a New Strategic Vision . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 27 5 IMPROVING THE PROCESS . . . . . . 29 Phases in the Process for the Vision Architect . . . . . 29 Lesson Implications . . . . 38 Conclusion . . . . . . 38 Notes . . . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 41...

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First, this study develops a generalized model for United States military transformations in peacetime. To develop the model the author combines observations made by several historians about recurrent trends in military strategic innovation. The author concludes that, after taking into account inevitable uncertainty, there are three identifiable factors that occur in most cases of military transformation. The three key factors are the need for a coherent, congruent vision; an emerging culture that bolsters the vision and develops competing theories of victory to fulfill the vision; and a process for honestly assessing the maturing vision and its supporting theories of victory. After defining the limitations of the model and its usefulness, the author applies the framework to an important aspect of national security—the future of space power....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE TRANSFORMATION TRINITY . . . . 9 3 THE SPACE POWER VISION: MECCA OR MIRAGE? . . . . .23 4 CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SPACE COMMUNITY . . . . 39 5 ASSESSING SPACE THEORIES OF VICTORY . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 73...

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The United States has over the last 16 years demonstrated amazing proficiency in winning military campaigns, but failure in securing “a better peace” as Basil Liddell Hart advocated. There is a need for an interagency analysis model, owned by the National Security Council (NSC), that can determine how the different instruments of power (IOP) can contribute to the achievement of the national strategic objectives, including which combination of IOPs is most efficient, but it must also bridge the strategic level of war to the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this paper proposes an analysis model based on Dr. Joseph L. Strange’s center of gravity (COG) model, Robert Pape’s concept of coercion, and effects-based operations (EBO). The model could create unity of effort in utilization of all national and international IOPs and in securing the necessary linkage among the three levels of war to affect the adversary’s will and his strategy....

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On 23 November 2010, the chief of staff of the Air Force tasked the Air Force Research Institute to review Air Force command and control (C2) to determine whether doctrine and organizational structures require changes to ensure success in uncertain and dynamic future scenarios. The research team concluded that, to maximize effectiveness, the Air Force must organize, train, and equip its C2 structure to increase adaptability, building improved integration with partners— especially below the combatant commander level. The study’s recommendations should lead to more effective and efficient operations in support of the joint force commander’s requirements. The study presents six questions to aid a commander in the design of an adaptable C2 structure. The answers to these questions will assist the commander in identifying the lowest appropriate organizational level to integrate operations. The questions address the following issues: the nature of an operation, available resources, capabilities of subordinate units, degree of trust and confidence, political risk, and the desire to exploit interaction among the speed, range, flexibility, v...

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introduction 1 A Framework for Analyzing Command and Control Structures 2 Analytical Model 2 results of the Analysis 5 Guidelines for Adaptive Command and Control 6 Using the Influences to Design Adaptive Command and Control 10 Organize, train, and equip: Observations and recommendations 12 Observation: Unclear Command Relationships 12 Recommendation: Broaden Airmen’s Understanding 14 Recommendation: Educate Airmen 15 Recommendation: Review Plans 17 Observation: Lack of Confidence and Trust 18 Recommendation: Create Organizational Structures to Produce Command and Control Capabilities at Appropriate Echelons 20 Recommendation: Establish Habitual Relationships 20 Observation: Lack of Capability and Capacity 20 Recommendation: Organize, Train, and Equip 23 Recommendation: Develop a Subtheater Force Development Strategy 27 Recommendation: Update Nuclear Command and Control Communications 29...

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I wanted to research and write a paper that will provide a culturally based view of social and political change and the strategic implications those changes might have on international relations and, specifically, military policy and planning. It is my hope that this research will give policy makers and planners cause to consider carefully the important underlying cultural factors that inevitably influence the strategic goals and behaviors of nations as they respond to a dynamic contextual environment and interact with each other on the global stage....

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A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

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The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

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1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

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In Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, Col Gregory J. Lengyel, United States Air Force (USAF), takes a comprehensive look at our national energy problems from a perspective unique to the Department of Defense (DOD). From his fictional opening implying that conflicts of the future could revolve around volatile world energy markets to his recommendations on creating and implementing a DOD energy strategy for improved energy security, the reader should find this book both thought provoking and informative....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 US ENERGY PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM—VULNERABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4 ENERGY STRATEGY FOR IMPROVED ENERGY SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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"Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World explains why SEAD has changed the basic fabric of air warfare. In discussing the familiar themes of the past and the emerging paradigms of the future, Colonel Brungess weaves a web of changing interrelationships among services, politico-military structures, and research and development strategies, as well as developing a novel methodology for assessing events critical to air power's future."...

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1 HISTORY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 CRITERIA FORASSESSING SEAD EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3 SERVICE APPROACHES TO SEAD . . . . . . .93 4 THE MERITS OF JSEAD: THE QUESTTO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 5 JSEAD: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE CHANGED THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 6 WHERE TO NEXT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . .xvii Essays Airpower in World War I, 1914–1918 . . . . . . .1 Robin Higham The True Believers: Airpower between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Alan Stephens Did the Bomber Always Get Through?: The Control of Strategic Airspace, 1939–1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 John McCarthy World War II: Air Support for Surface Forces 85 Vincent Orange World War II: The Bombing of Germany . . 107 Richard J. Overy Definite Limitations: The Air War in Korea 1950–1953 . . . . . . . 143 Jeffrey Grey The Air War in Vietnam: Reevaluating Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169 C. D. Coulthard-Clark Airpower as a National Instrument: The Arab-Israeli Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 R. A. Mason It Was a Bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the S...

Description Details
This study analyzes the asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower across the political, operational, and tactical levels of war and examines whether the U.S. has adequately prepared itself to counter asymmetrical measures against its airpower assets. The answers are not reassuring....

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INTRODUCTION.......1 The Question.......2 Background and Significance of the Problem.....2 Limitations of the Study..... 4 Methodology.......5 Terminology.....6 Preview of the Argument.....7 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL....... 10 Propaganda.....11 Coalition Busting..... 15 Enemy Measures to Change U.S. Targeting Strategy.......22 Conclusion.....25 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.......28 Attacking Airpower on the Ramp.......30 Aircraft Carriers.....33 Deception.....36 Urban Warfare.....39 Conclusion..... 42 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL.....44 The Israeli Experience..... 45 MANPADS.......48 The Laser Threat.......51 Conclusion..... 54 CONCLUSIONS.......57...

Description Details
Lack of investment in future agile combat-support technologies could lead to a strategic surprise that diverts military attention and resources from critical air, space, and cyber operations. Looking to the national security environment in 2030, this research explores one technology—the microbial fuel cell (MFC)—that gives life to self-contained facilities decoupled from vulnerable supply lines and infrastructure networks. MFCs can dispose of waste (sewage, food scraps, gray water, etc.) while producing clean water (up to 70 percent of required volumes) and power (up to 600 watts per person). Using relevance tree methodology, the research concludes that USAF research and development investment alone will not bring MFCs to fruition. A successful strategy for MFCs will be collaborative, addressing not only the technological barriers but also the key social, industrial, and political hurdles to enabling this capability....

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This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

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1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

Description Details
This study analyzes how real-time battle damage assessment (BDA) might contribute to airpower strategy and execution. It provides a historical review of BDA during World War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War and examines the current BDA doctrine, capabilities, and procedures to illustrate contemporary strengths and shortcomings. This study identifies potential remedies to contemporary issues based on real-time BDA solutions by addressing technological, procedural, and organizational aspects. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of these possible remedies, with respect to airpower planning and execution, to identify viable solutions. This study assesses how alternative solutions might affect airpower strategy formation and execution by examining the improvements intelligence agencies and the services are likely to pursue over the near term and concludes with recommendations for the future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT . . . . 3 3 BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TODAY . . . . . 15 4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPOWER . . . . . . 47 GLOSSARY . . . . 55...

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This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

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1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...